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Introduction [1]
Philosophers,  ideologists  or  mere  intellectual  guru’s  have  considered 
property from radically opposed standpoints. For some, like Adam Smith or 
Thomas Jefferson, property was sacred, for others, like Rousseau or Marx, it 
was merely a theft that lies at the origin of inequality and exploitation. In 
the information age, one is more interested in intellectual property than in 
the  tangible  one,  e.g.  real  estate.  As  soon  as  one  makes  the  distinction 
between  intellectual  and  tangible  property,  one  notices  that  the  most 
ancient traditions treat them quite differently. The Old Testament implies 
that tangible property is sacred, taken into account that the Promised Land 
was granted by God himself to his people of choice. Moreover, in modern 
times, the early American pioneers regarded the New World as a continent 
which Providence has given to them (Mihalache 2005: p. 106). Conversely, 
the Greek Mythology narrates that the secret of fire-making was stolen by 
Prometheus from the Gods, which was clearly a case of patent infringement.
All along history, the place intellectual property occupied in the interval 
that ranged from sacred to theft shifted back and forth from one end to the 
other.  However,  in  recent  years,  intellectual  property  has  become  even 
more sacred than the tangible one. One often takes for granted the rationale 
for  intellectual  property  protection,  based  mainly  on  moral  grounds, 
without  a  lucid,  critical  appraisal  of  the  general  benefits  or  bad 
consequences of excessive protection. We shall provide an overview of the 
evolution  of  intellectual  property  rights,  which  is  bound  to  clarify  the 
present–day  issues  and  to  provide  some  ideas  for  a  balanced  legal 
enforcement procedure.
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Knowledge as Non-Commercial Property [2]
Taking money for  disseminating  knowledge has  long been  considered 
inappropriate.  In  ancient  Athens,  Socrates  blamed the  sophists  for  such 
commercial  procedures.  That  is  why  only  those  that  could  support 
themselves,  like  Plato,  from  tangible  property,  could  afford  to  provide 
intellectual enlightenment. In the times of the Roman Empire, one did not 
live  from  the  sale  of  one’s  publications.  Multiplication  by  copying  was 
expensive, making the dissemination of knowledge prohibitive. Thus, the 
grants  awarded  by  the  emperor  or  by  the  rich  sponsors  were  the  only 
means to foster intellectual achievement. However, writing for fame alone 
did  not  prevent  the  authors  from  being  resentful  towards  those  that 
borrowed without consent part of their works. Cicero was the first to claim 
that  knowledge  was  as  much  a  good  as  property  (possesio).  Plagiarism 
comes from  plagiarius,  a Latin word that initially signified the person that 
took a slave from his lawful owner. Later on, Martial blamed the authors of 
compilations  (compilatio),  who  used  to  appropriate  large  excerpts  from 
others’ works.
However,  in the Middle Ages, compilations were generally accepted as 
creative works. The remnants of knowledge from the good old times were 
so precious and scarce that any means to preserve and to disseminate them 
was considered acceptable. Isidor of Seville tried hard in order to provide a 
compendium of  the  ancient  knowledge,  in  the  form of  an encyclopedia, 
before it  would get lost,  so that he was entitled to become, according to 
Vatican’s decision, the saint of the Internet. Knowledge was, in those days, 
public property for the few that cared for it. Moreover, any commerce with 
knowledge was unthinkable. In the XIIIth Century, precisely when the first 
Universities bloomed, the basic idea was that  Scientia donum dei est, unde  
vendi non potest. (Science is a gift from God; therefore it cannot be bought or sold) 
(Burke 2000:  p. 216).  Knowledge belongs  only  to  God,  not  to  those  that 
managed to  acquire  it.  They  were  not  its  creators,  but  the  recipients  of 
knowledge,  mercifully inspired by Him, so that they should act as mere 
intercessors, without any demand for payment. St. Bernard denoted such 
claim as  turpis  quaestus (shameful  gain). However,  the staff  of the newly–
founded universities (the faculty or academia) needed something to live on. 
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The  solution  to  the  problem  was  provided  by  the  observation  that  the 
intellectual  should  be  paid  only  for  the  pains  he  takes,  not  for  the 
knowledge he dispenses. There were two ways to reward the professors. 
The first was the wages, which could be paid directly by the student (the 
customer) or by the public authority: local council or prince. However, the 
Church was opposed to students paying taxes. At the Lateran Council, Pope 
Alexander  III  proclaimed  the  principle  that  learning  should  be  free, 
enabling thus the poor students to gain access to knowledge. An alternate 
means to provide for the professors was the benefit: a land rent or a church 
function (officium). In the first case, the intellectual was driven to real estate 
investments  and  speculations,  which  should  not  have  been  his  main 
concern. In the second case, the faculty would benefit from the church, thus 
leaving  open the  door  for  its  involvement  in  the  academic  process.  The 
cathedra (chair) would have been associated with the cathedral, in the sense of 
a physical, as well as ideological, proximity.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  although  Pope  Innocent  III  acknowledged  the 
distinction between the didactic and the religious function, such was the 
influence of the church on the university that a gap was created between 
‘high’  knowledge,  according  to  religious  standards,  and  practical 
knowledge e.g.  accounting or engineering.  The gap still  exists  nowadays 
and efforts are made to bridge it.
Intellectual Property in the Printing Machine Time [3]
The printing machine was a harbinger of the industrial age. For the first 
time, knowledge could be easily disseminated, as it could be packaged in a 
series  of  identical  objects,  sold  as  commodities.  This  basic  idea  of  the 
industrial  economy would be extended to all  sorts of products 350 years 
later, when the steam engine would be invented. The commerce with books 
announces prematurely the commerce with goods. The easy spread of ideas 
did not fail to challenge the political power. In order to get some control 
over  publications,  privileges  were  granted  to  publishers.  Thus,  nobody 
could publish a book without the consent of the authority and nobody else 
could reprint it without permission. François I in France, Charles V in Spain, 
the  Parliament  in  England (The  Licensing  Act  from 1662)  aimed  to  get 
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control and, as a by product, publishers were endowed with property rights 
on content. One notices that the technological leap in reproduction implied 
an enforcement of the intellectual property rights. The law gave publishers 
a monopoly as a way to make easier to control what was published. There 
are, however, some isolated examples of authors who owned the content 
they  created  (Burke  2000:  p  222).  The  first  copyright  was  granted  to 
Marcantonio  Sabellico,  author  of  a  History  of  Venice,  published  in  1486. 
Titian’s paintings were copyrighted against forgery in 1567, in Venice. The 
first patent was obtained in 1421, by Brunelleschi, for the particular design 
of  a  ship.  However,  they  were  the  exception,  not  the  rule.  Usually,  the 
editors owned the content and the authors had to rely on their benevolence 
in order to get paid. Thus, Jacob Tonson, from the Conger group, owned 
Shakespeare’s works until as late as 1774. 
The  Statute  of  Anne  (England,  1710)  was  a  turning  point  as  far  as 
intellectual property rights were concerned. This was the first copyright act 
that focused on authors rather than editors. According to it, all published 
works would get a copyright term of 14 years, renewable once, if the author 
was alive at the time. Moreover, all works already published would get a 
single additional term of 21 years. The Statute of Anne was the first law that 
instituted what we call now the public domain. However, the contradiction 
between positive law (the Statute) and the common law enabled publishers 
to defer the application of the Statute until 1774, when the public domain 
eventually emerged. 
The US Constitution was devised by men who had the utmost respect for 
property.  That  is  why  the  Vth  Amendment  specifies  that  a  just 
compensation should be given to anyone for  taking his property for  the 
benefit  of  the  state.  However,  the  Founding  Fathers  made  a  clear  cut 
distinction between tangible property and the intellectual one. The first was 
sacred,  the  second  was  considered  in  the  spirit  of  the  Statute  of  Anne. 
Creative  property  is,  according  to  the  Constitution,  only  temporarily 
protected; afterwards, it goes to the public domain. It is important to note 
that  the  rights  are  given  to  authors  and inventors,  not  to  publishers  or 
patrons. The Progress Clause runs as following: “Congress has the power to 
promote Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
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and  Discoveries”.  The  general  interest  claims  that  intellectual  property 
should  be  protected,  in  order  to  stimulate  creativeness,  but  also  that  it 
should not be indefinitely protected, in order not to stifle in its cradle the 
future developments of old ideas. 
We have witnessed, in the US legislation, a continuous tendency to extend 
the term of the copyright law, from 1790 to our time. In 1790, the copyright 
held for 14 years and it was renewable once for another 14 years, only upon 
the author’s demand, if he was still alive at that time. In 1831, the initial 
term was extended to 28 years, supplanted by an additional 14 years, upon 
renewal. By 1909, the initial term extended to 28 years and another 28 years 
were  added,  based  on  the  author’s  request.  Since  1962,  progressive 
extensions of existing and future copyrights have been provided. A turning 
point is 1976, when all existing copyrights were extended by 19 years and, 
more important, the demand for renewal was no longer required. Works 
created after 1978 would be protected during the author’s lifetime and 50 
years after,  while corporations would hold the copyright for 75 years.  In 
1998, the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act added another 20 years to all 
existing copyrights. This tendency to progressively extend copyrights had 
some  relationship  with  the  interests  of  corporations  who  wanted  to 
preserve  their  monopolies  on  certain  brands:  Walt  Disney  was  very 
reluctant to release Mickey Mouse into the public domain. 
Not only the duration of copyrights were extended, but also their scope. 
At first, copyright was related to maps, charts and books. Derivative works 
were not included, so that anyone could freely transform a novel into a play 
or provide a sequel to a good story. By the end of the XXth Century, any 
creative work - music, architecture, design, fashion, software – fell under 
the restriction of the copyright law, which also controlled derivative works. 
Moreover, the copyright is obtained automatically, based on the very act of 
publication, without demand for registration and without the deposit of a 
copy. Also, the demand for renewal is no longer required. All the above 
considerations do not hold for patents. In their case, registration is required, 
the duration of  exclusive rights is  fixed at 20 years  from the application 
filing and they cannot be renewed.
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The Case of the Knowledge-Based Economy [4]
Nothing is more wrong than to consider the virtual as the opposite of the 
‘real’.  The virtual space, cyberspace, has the same objective reality as the 
tangible, physical space itself. It is composed of the totality of sites online 
and each cybernaut can follow the same route along them as another. The 
economic  agents  acting  online  as  dotcoms  form  the  virtual,  or  the  e-
economy.  However,  the  “New  Economy”  is  a  broader  concept,  as  it 
includes  the  companies  from  the  tangible  space,  which  extended  their 
businesses in cyberspace, adapted their methods accordingly, and adopted 
some new economic business models. 
The virtual economic exchange confronts two tenacious prejudices.  The 
first  denies  any novelty  to  the  “new” economy,  and considers  it  only  a 
division of the service economy. The service itself is not incorporated into a 
commodity, so that the models that govern the service economy could be 
successfully  employed  for  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  virtual 
economy.  This  crude  simplification  is  apparent  in  the  reform  policy  of 
academic  training  within  the  Bologna  treaty.  According  to  the  Bologna 
framework, the student is the customer, the professor is the supplier in the 
process of knowledge transfer, which is perceived as the pouring of content 
from the source to a recipient. One overlooks the obvious fact that a service 
is  necessarily  guaranteed,  while  the  transfer  of  knowledge  is  not.  The 
lawyer is not responsible for winning a case, he only assists his client with 
his expertise; the physician is not bound to cure the disease, but to supply 
medical care; the professor, at his turn, is only a guide who shows you the 
way, not a vehicle to carry you to the destination point. In virtual economy 
too, there is not a guarantee for success. The transformation of information 
into knowledge, that is expertise formation, supposes cooperation between 
the  parties  involved  in  the  trading  process,  based  on  mutual  trust,  but 
unsure  of  the  final  result.  The  knowledge  supplier,  unlike  the  service 
supplier, gives only a chance to win, not an insurance against losses. 
The  second  prejudice,  even  more  important,  denies  that  the  virtual 
exchange could be managed using money as  an instrument.  The virtual 
commerce of commodities does not raise such problems, but it is a hybrid. 
When ordering a commodity online, a process is triggered, partially in the 
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virtual space, partially in the tangible one. In the first, the payer’s card is 
debited;  in  the  second,  the  product  is  packaged  and  sent.  As  soon  as 
intangible entities are involved the reasoning comes to a standstill. One is 
naturally willing to pay for a book bought online at www.amazon.com or 
www.polirom.ro but one hesitates to pay for the electronic file of a book 
available to download. The reason of this behavior lies in the fact that, upon 
selling a tangible product, the seller parts with it, he does not possess it any 
longer; becomes the property of the customer. When intangible products are 
sold, they remain in the possession of the supplier. One should pay only for 
such things that the vendor is deprived of. The distribution of entities which 
are  not  incorporated  into  physical,  tangible,  objects  should  follow other 
rules than the ones economic science accustomed us to. 
The virtual economy was, at its beginnings, a gift economy. The famous 
Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, written in the romantic period 
of the net by John Perry Barlow, asked the authorities of the tangible space 
to abstain: Governors of the industrial world, you weary giants of steel and stone,  
I come from cyberspace, the new home of the mind. In the name of the future, I ask  
you,  who belong to  the  past,  to  leave  us  alone.  In the “new world”,  money 
should not matter. Why ask a price when, as a reward for one’s intellectual 
contribution, one can get for free, at one’s convenience, much more than one 
ever provided, from the digitalized treasury of knowledge? The exchange 
becomes  ideal:  one  gives  less  and  gets  more.  In  a  world  of  knowledge 
abundance,  the  communist  slogan  gets  a  fresh  look:  “from  everybody, 
according  to  his  capacities;  to  anybody,  according  to  his  needs”.  The 
reference is not only the communist doctrine, but also the North-American 
practice of potlatch. The term signifies those exchanges which are not traded 
at the lowest price, but tend to overwhelm the customer by the supplier’s 
generosity. The representatives of an Indian-American tribe are invited to a 
ceremony by another tribe.  They receive a large quantity of gifts and,  at 
their turn, they invite their donors and try to overcome them by an even 
more generous offer.  The winner is  he who gives most,  and thus gets  a 
superior status. He wins the others’ respect and, consequently, his own self 
respect. 
It was then natural for the virtual economy to be a gift economy. This idea 
is  supported  by  the  marginalist  economic  theory.  This  explains  the 
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mechanisms of the industrial economy by the concept of marginal cost that 
is the additional cost involved in the production of a supplementary unit. 
Contrary  to  the  Marxian  approach,  which  explained  value  as  the 
incorporation  of  work  that  is  proportional  to  the  required  time  for 
completing a product unit, the marginalists found the objective source of 
profit  outside  the  ethical  considerations  related  to  exploitation  and  the 
appropriation of the plus value by the capitalist. They showed that in an 
ideally competition-based economy, as soon as the marginal cost becomes 
equal  to  the  price  on  the  market,  the  volume  of  production  finds  its 
equilibrium  point.  The  profit  results  from  the  difference  between  the 
marginal  cost  and  the  average  unitary  cost  (Blaug 1992:  p.  363).  If  one 
applies  the  marginalist  theory  to  the  virtual  economy,  one  notices  an 
unsuspected  peculiarity.  In  the  industrial  economy,  the  marginal  cost 
decreases  with the  production  volume until  it  reaches  a minimum,  then 
begins  to  increase,  as  supplementary  investments  are  needed.  On  the 
contrary,  in  the  virtual  economy,  the  marginal  cost  does  not  increase, 
whatever the production volume. The production of the first version of a 
software  program  involves  a  very  high  cost,  taking  into  account  the 
research  and  development  efforts  required.  However,  the  cost  of  an 
additional  copy  of  the  software  is  next  to  zero.  Its  asymptotic  decrease 
supports  the  idea  that  the  intangible  products  developed  in  cyberspace 
should be distributed for free. 
The  fact  that  the  virtual  economy  should  be  a  gift  economy  finds  an 
additional support in the famous work of Marcel Mauss (Mauss 1923-1924). 
The French anthropologist studied the system of exchanges of the American 
Indians  and  proved  that  a  gift  economy  is  perfectly  viable.  The  gift 
preserves the imprint of the donor’s personality, his ‘aura’. Consequently, 
donation is never pure and simple; it resembles more to a loan. In order to 
get rid of the magic influence of the object, the person that received it has to 
react in the same generous manner and to amply compensate his supplier, 
overwhelming him, if possible, with other gifts. The winner does not take 
all,  but  gives  more,  thus  acquiring  a  superior  social  status.  Mauss 
conception  was  criticized  and  several  counter  examples  were  provided 
(Testart 1998; Laidlaw 2000). Such counter examples come from marginal, 
but typical exchanges from the tangible space. Testart considered the case of 
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charity  performed  towards  a  perfect  stranger;  Laidlow  pointed  to  the 
practices  of  Indian  ascetics,  who  accept  food  from  anyone  as  granted, 
without reciprocation. However, Mauss’ ideas seem appropriate to describe 
the exchange of virtual entities. The tangible object is a natural extension of 
the body of its manufacturer, it remains constitutive to him. The knowledge 
disseminated on the net is detached from the body of its author, it floats 
above him. The inseparability  between the gift  and the donor fits  in the 
framework  of  Mauss’  model,  provided  that  the  gift  is  tangible.  Such 
‘organic’  relationship  lacks  in  the  case  of  the  virtual  product.  He  who 
contributes disinterestedly to the advancement of knowledge can be amply 
compensated at his turn, but not necessarily according to a reciprocal rule. 
He can himself  plunge into the  vast  amount of  knowledge  provided by 
cyberspace, in order to satisfy his needs. Everyone that participates in the 
virtual processes is supposed to bring his own contribution; otherwise his 
virtual  identity  remains  incomplete  and  suffers  from  lack  of 
acknowledgement.
In spite of the expectations of the romantic pioneers of cyberspace and of 
the  reasoning  inspired  from  the  marginalist  doctrine  and  from  the 
anthropological research, the virtual economy did not develop into a gift 
economy. The big fortunes accumulated in the years of the dot-com bubble, 
as well as the penetration of corporations into cyberspace are enough proof 
that  money,  albeit  virtual  money,  remains  the  main  means  that  makes 
economy go. The idea that knowledge should not be paid for, as the donor 
is not deprived of it, fades when one considers the fact that anyone who 
shares his knowledge loses some of his competitive edge with respect to 
others. The penetration of corporation by such projects as CNN Pipeline or 
by fusions between traditional media companies and net-based ones (Walt 
Disney  and  Lycos,  Time  Warner  and  AOL)  proves  that  the  logic  of 
capitalism holds even in cyberspace. There remains still, in the interstitials 
of the net, an intermediary manner of doing business, halfway between the 
gift  economy  and  the  market  economy.  This  is  the  open  source  or  free 
software  movement  (Bauwens  2005),  which  claims  that  the  codes  of 
operating  systems  and  of  the  applications  based  on  them  should  be  a 
common property.  The contributions of  the participants  in these projects 
remain the common property of the members of the movement; nobody can 
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appropriate whatever, not even the results of one’s own research. However, 
these  are  not  distributed  for  free  on  the  net,  beyond  the  community 
associated with the project.  What  is  available is  free in the sense of free 
speech, not in the sense of a free beer. 
Property Rights in Cyberspace [5]
The Information  and Communication  Technology  (ICT),  provides  new 
and more effective means for content reproduction. The copyright law was 
devised  basically  for  the  printing  technology  and  was  progressively 
adjusted to the audio-visual ones. Plagiarism and piracy are made easier by 
ICT.  Moreover, as we have seen from the previous section, the knowledge-
based economy failed to become a gift economy and, since the ‘burst of the 
bubble’ and the penetration of corporations in cyberspace, new sources of 
sound revenue are needed, in order to promote creativeness. The protection 
of intellectual  property rights in cyberspace becomes vital  if  we want to 
make the e-economy go. How to detect and how to punish the infringement 
of intellectual property is a major challenge to the law experts. 
Extension  into  cyberspace  of  the  copyright  laws that  rule  the  tangible 
space is by no means straightforward. We have seen that, in tangible space, 
any  published  work  is  automatically  protected.  However,  physical 
publication is also a legitimating act, a symbolic acknowledgement of the 
authorship status. As anybody can ’publish’ almost anything on the web, do 
such virtual publications fall under the rules of copyright? 
First, if we consider sites with editorial impact, with a board for reviewing 
proposals prior to posting them, online-publication observes the same rules 
as  the  ‘real’  one.  Virtual  publications  can  be  quoted  or  included  in  a 
bibliographical list, on the condition that the URL and the date of the most 
recent access are provided. Usually, the author keeps his copyright and is 
entitled to publish subsequently his work on paper, the virtual copy being 
withdrawn in that case. Any reproduction of the website content without 
the permission of the author is illegal. This can be illustrated by such sites as 
www.ctheory.net or www.liternet.ro .
In  the  case  of  personal  sites  or  blogs,  the  work  belongs  to  the  public 
domain.  The  author  is  supposed  to  disseminate  freely  his  work  via  his 
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website and to attract collaboration via his blog. There are situations when 
the content of a personal website or of a blog catches the eye of a ‘real life’ 
publisher,  who could appropriate it without much ado. However,  taking 
into account that the author royalties do not amount to more than 10% of 
the profits,  the editorial  practice is  to contact  the website’s  or  the blog’s 
owner, in order to make a deal. Considering the issue the other way round, 
the reproduction of a printed work on a personal website or blog is strictly 
prohibited, according to the existing copyright laws. The Gutenberg Project 
(www.gutenberg.org)  provides  a  vast  amount  of  literary  works,  but  all 
belong  to  the  public  domain.  The  EuroLiteraTur  Project 
(euroliteratur.magister.ro) is rather more flexible. While only texts from the 
public domain are reproduced, video and audio files are provided for some 
works that are still under protection.
The e-mails pose some ambiguity problems, because one does not make a 
clear difference between copyright and privacy. The e-mail is not private in 
the sense a telephone conversation is. The anti-terrorist legal measures in 
the USA treat, however, e-mails and telephone calls much in the same way. 
A suspect’s calls and e-mails can be monitored by the police, even without 
the decision of a law court (as it used to be the case before 9/11), but only as 
far as the addresses are concerned, not the content itself. 
However,  the decision of  Judge Thomas Pennfield Jackson to admit  e-
mails  as  pieces  of  evidence  in  the  USA  vs.  Microsoft case  provided  a 
precedent in support of the idea that e-mails should belong to the public 
domain. An interesting case is related to the widespread practice of people 
who write comments on articles and send them via e-mail to the publishers. 
Once, the editor of a magazine decided to print excerpts from such e-mails. 
The authors could not invoke a privacy issue, taken into account that they 
intended,  by  sending  those  e-mails,  to  make  their  opinions  public. 
However,  some  of  them  invoked  a  copyright  infringement:  the  editor 
reproduced a work without the author’s consent. Scribbling some words on 
paper does not entail property rights, only publishing those does. However, 
as the technical means for scribbling and for publishing are the same, the 
distinction seems to get blurred. 
Software is treated mostly as a copyrighted text;  however,  lately, some 
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software  programs  were  patented,  such  as  1-click  payment,  property  of 
amazon.com. One would wonder why a patent should be preferred to a 
copyright that lasts much longer, but it is obvious that a program used for 
practical application on a large scale is bound to bring more money in a 
shorter lapse of time, if patented. In order to patent a program, this must be 
able to control a process, such as an online transaction. 
Software developers keep complaining about piracy and produce ample 
accounts of the losses it involves. Curiously enough, until very recently, the 
corporations  did  not  employ  very  severe  code-based  means  to  prevent 
piracy. Instead, they kept pressuring governments to stop it,  making the 
political authorities responsible for the protection of their property rights. 
At  their  turn, governments,  while deploring piracy,  took only occasional 
and well-advertised actions against it, instead of systematic attempts to put 
an end to it. Game theory helps to explain both strategies. Piracy extends 
the market for original products via the network effect, according to which 
the value of a product increases with the number of people using it. On the 
other  hand,  piracy  decreases  the  selling  price  of  the  original  product 
(Poddar 2005). On the whole, original suppliers get lower revenues than in 
the  no  piracy  case.  However,  under  globalization,  new markets  become 
available and it is important to be the first  to occupy them. That is why 
corporations  are  ready to sacrifice  some of  their  profit  in order  to  get  a 
larger market share. Moreover, the social welfare, that is the sum of all the 
revenues and the consumer surplus, increases, under piracy, which explains 
governments’ ambiguous strategies.  
The printing technology triggered the legislative effort that amounted to 
the  Statute  of  Anne  and  its  subsequent  developments.  At  its  turn, 
information technology brought about new regulations of property rights, 
as  summarized  by  the  Digital  Millennium  Copyright  Act  (DMCA). 
According to DMCA, technology itself should control the replication and 
distribution of copyrighted content.  The law should control and ban any 
technology  designed  to  circumvent  copyright  protection  measures. 
Lawrence Lessig aptly remarked that the former ways of regulation – the 
law system, the set of norms, the market incentives – tend to be replaced by 
code-based  regulations.  In  an  ideally  organized  cyberspace,  any 
mischievous conduct would be technically impossible.  However, one still 
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needs law-form regulations like DMCA in order to deter the development 
of such codes that would subvert those codes that are supposed to defend 
the property rights. 
A Critical View on Copyright Enforcement [6]
It  would  be  absurd  to  criticize  the  protection  of  intellectual  property 
rights from a moral standpoint. However, it is meaningful to do it from the 
point of view of the general interest. As stated in the US Constitution, the 
aim of the copyright law is ultimately to promote progress, not to secure 
monopolies. The law, as it is nowadays, considers, on one side, the creators 
of content and, on the other side, the consumers,  as two different, fixed, 
non-overlapping sets.  As  a matter  of  fact,  this  is  definitely  not  the  case. 
Those that create content are precisely the same that benefit most from the 
creation of others. Extending copyright in time and scope limits the public 
domain and prevents access to the available knowledge precisely to those 
who need it most, who work to develop and add value to it. Thus, the effect 
of  over-protecting  property  rights  is  the  limitation  of  the  knowledge 
production. The evolution of copyright enforcement can be traced reading 
the following table top down.  
Tables: Evolution of copyright enforcement
1 Publish Transform 2 Publish Transform
Commercial © Free Commercial © ©
Noncommercial Free Free Noncommercial Free Free
3 Publish Transform 4 Publish Transform
Commercial © © Commercial © ©
Noncommercial ©/Free Free Noncommercial © ©
One can see that, at first, only publishing a work was ruled by copyright; 
derivative rights were not considered, so that transforming the work was 
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acceptable. Moreover, non-commercial use was not restricted in any way; 
even multiplication was accepted, on account that the technology of private 
copying could not rival with commercial dissemination. Then, transforming 
for commercial purposes a published work was prohibited and, afterwards, 
when  photocopiers  became  available,  copyrights  were  at  least  partially 
extended to include non-commercial multiplication. At present, fair use of a 
work is so restricted that using content as raw material to create content has 
become increasingly difficult. 
Another effect of the tendency of over protection of intellectual property 
rights is that knowledge that used to be public is increasingly privatized by 
copyright  and  patent  enforcement.  Traditionally,  property  rights  were 
related to expression and invention. The layer of ideas above, as well as the 
facts below, remained in the public domain for all to draw on, to innovate 
anew. Ideas and facts could never be owned. This explains why, in 1918, 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis confidently claimed that “the general 
rule of law is that the noblest of human productions – knowledge, truths 
ascertained,  conceptions,  and  ideas  –  become,  after  voluntary 
communication to others, free as the air to common use”. Nowadays, the 
European Database  Protection Directive  provides  proprietary rights  over 
compilation of  facts;  patents  over  genes are  sources  of  profit  for  private 
companies,  who benefit  from a publicly  funded,  prior  research.  It  is  not 
without reason that the tendency to reduce the public domain in all respects 
was  considered  similar  to  the  policy  of  enclosure  in  XVIIIth  Century 
England, when the commons were appropriated by the lords, backed by the 
law (Boyle 2003). 
It  is  somewhat  surprising  to  note  that  the  most  eloquent  advocates  of 
property rights are the libertarians.  On the one hand, there attitude makes 
sense, as they regard all property as sacred,  including the intellectual  one. 
On the other hand, it does not, taking into account their opposition  to the 
state  regulation  of  the  markets.  According  to  libertarianism,  the  state  is 
supposed only to fight monopolies,  in order to provide a free, competitive 
environment  for  economic  development.  However,  as  far  as  intellectual 
property rights are concerned, the state is called upon to enforce monopolies 
in knowledge-based systems  of production, in the form of copyrights and 
patents. This contradiction does not seem to bother those who assume it.
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Concluding Remarks [7]
Some practical actions are easy to perform in order to preserve intellectual 
property  rights  without  excessively  restricting  the  access  to  knowledge. 
They can be summarized as follows:
Lower  the  barriers  that  traditional  intellectual  property  erects  against 
global educational and cultural access. This can be achieved by shortening 
the terms until a work becomes part of the public domain.
Provide  copyright  only  on  demand.  There  are  plenty  of  authors  who 
would be only too glad to see their ideas embraced and further developed, 
without  receiving any monetary  reward.  Cyrano de Bergerac  would have 
been less known today, had not Molière appropriated a line from one of his 
plays: Que diable allait-il faire dans cette galère? Copyright should be restricted 
to works with commercial value. According to reliable statistics, they do not 
amount to more than 5% of the whole intellectual production. It is true, on 
the other hand, that works that did not have a chance for commercial success 
in the foreseeable  future developed,  on a sudden,  unsuspected commercial 
qualities. T. S. Eliot wrote refined poems for the happy few and was only too 
glad to sell  his copyright  to  Faber and Faber.  The editor,  who subsequently 
sold the derivative rights for Old Possum’s Book of Practical Cats, was the first 
to be delightfully surprised at the success of the musical Cats.
Do  not  oppose  the  ‘real’  to  the  virtual.  There  is  a  faint  suspicion  that 
whatever comes up in cyberspace is either worthless or illegal. The DMCA 
creates  as  many  barriers  as  possible  to  the  Web  2.0  projects,  based  on 
collaborative  work,  e.g.  Wikipedia  or  MySpace.  Such  projects  involve  the 
pooling of various sources of information into a new architecture and dealing 
with every minor copyright issue slows down the process of development.  
In the globalization age, WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) 
should facilitate the transfer of technology related to industrial property to 
the developing countries, in order accelerate economic, social and cultural 
development.  Intellectual  property  rights  are  tools,  and  WIPO  needs  to 
respond creatively and flexibly to the new ways, in which those tools can be 
used, not view any new method of innovation as somehow illegitimate.
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